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Abstract	The	 cost	 to	 investors	 of	 investing	 in	 mutual	 equity	 funds	 through	management	 fees,	 could	 be	 substantial	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 return	 they	generate.	 If	 the	 fees	 are	 fairly	 set,	 they	 should	 give	 investors	 a	 high	 excess	return,	termed	alpha,	when	compared	to	a	passive	benchmark.	Management	fees	have	been	shown	to	give	negative	excess	return	in	the	US	market,	and	we	regress	the	excess	return	of	Swedish	equity	funds	as	estimated	by	CAPM	on	management	 fees.	 Our	 prediction	 is	 that	 higher	 management	 fees	 leads	 to	lower	alpha.					
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Introduction	
We	looked	into	the	question	of	whether	the	risk-adjusted	return	of	equity	funds	domiciled	in	Sweden,	and	investing	in	the	Swedish	stock	market,	has	a	statistical	relationship	with	their	management	 fees.	Using	a	standard	capital	asset	pricing	model,	 first	 developed	 by	William	 Sharpe	 (1964)	 and	 John	 Lintner	 (1965),	we	investigated	how	the	excess	net	return,	or	alpha	in	CAPM	terminology,	relevant	to	an	investor	in	the	Swedish	fund	market	relate	to	these	fees.		The	subject	of	fund	management	fees	is	relevant	to	most	Swedes	today,	as	every	working	 individual	will	 earn	 fund	credits	 in	 the	state-run	pension	scheme,	and	thereby	have	 the	option	of	 choosing	 funds	 themselves.	At	 the	 end	of	2013,	6.9	million	Swedes	were	part	of	this	pension	scheme.	The	cost	to	investors	through	management	fees	could	be	substantial	over	long	time	periods	when	compared	to	the	return	they	receive.	If	the	fees	are	set	in	a	way	that	takes	both	the	interest	of	the	 investor	 and	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 fund	 manager	 into	 account,	 the	 fees	attributable	 to	 the	 latter	 should	 give	 investors	 a	 high	 excess	 return	 when	compared	to	the	return	of	a	passive	index	benchmark.		Fund	 managers	 and	 banks	 will	 argue	 that	 private	 investors	 receive	 a	 service	when	 investing	 in	 their	 fund:	 an	 active	 management	 that	 both	 increases	 the	return	they	receive	and	decreases	the	risk	doing	so.	Passive	index	funds	will	only	follow	their	benchmark	regardless	of	market	conditions.	The	first	argument	will	logically	lead	you	to	believe	that	higher	fees	are	better	than	lower	fees.	The	more	you	pay	 for	 someone	handling	 your	 investments,	 the	more	 likely	 it	 is	 that	 this	manager	 is	 more	 skilled	 than	 other	 market	 participants,	 and	 that	 banks	 and	other	 financial	 institutions	 therefore	 provide	 a	 highly	 valuable	 service	 to	 their	
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costumers.	On	the	other	hand,	lower	fees	are	better	for	costumers	since	more	of	the	return	will	go	back	directly	to	them.	There	seems	to	be	diverging	logic	which	on	the	one	hand	tells	you	that	high	fees	might	be	good	for	you,	and	on	the	other	hand	 the	 logic	 that	 lower	 fees,	 or	 costs,	 naturally	 are	 preferable	 to	 rational	individuals.		A	number	of	 studies	 in	 this	 field	have	 shown	 that	management	 fees	negatively	impact	 investor	 return	 on	 at	 least	 a	 one-to-one	 relationship	 (see	 for	 example:	Carhart,	1997;	Elton,	Gruber,	Das	&	Hlavka,	1993;	Fama	&	French,	2010;	Jensen,	1968),	but	those	studies	have	for	the	most	part	been	conducted	on	the	US	stock	market.	We	will	on	the	other	hand	study	Swedish	equity	 funds	during	the	time	period	of	2000	until	2014,	to	see	whether	the	same	conclusions	can	be	made	in	a	different	 market.	 The	 excess	 return	 of	 our	 sample	 of	 funds	 will	 be	 estimated	using	a	standard	capital	asset	management	model,	and	will	then	be	regressed	on	the	management	 fees	of	each	 fund	 to	show	the	statistical	 relationship	between	the	two	variables.	The	 mutual	 fund	 industry	 serves	 several	 purposes:	 it	 allows	 small	 private	investors	easy	access	 to	 financial	markets	at	 low	costs,	 it	 gives	 them	a	broadly	diversified	 investment	 allocation	 with	 a	 relatively	 small	 investment,	 and	 it	provides	 investors	 with	 the	 professional	 skills	 and	 decision	 making	 of	 fund	managers	 (Anderson	&	Ahmed,	2005).	When	evaluating	 fund	performance,	 the	total	 return	might	 at	 first	 sight	 be	 the	 best	 criterion,	 but	 selecting	 investment	vehicles	will	also	depend	on	the	individual	risk	aversion	of	the	investor	and	the	relative	risk	that	he	or	she	will	have	been	exposed	to	in	gaining	those	returns.	In	financial	 literature,	 this	 is	 called	 the	 risk-adjusted	 return,	which	 indicates	 that	
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high	 returns	 are	 not	 always	 better	 than	 low	 returns	when	 the	 volatility	 of	 the	underlying	asset	prices	are	taken	into	consideration.	Mutual	 funds	 charge	management	 fees	 for	 the	 services	 they	 provide.	Whether	the	 investment	 objective	 or	 the	 size	 of	 the	 fund,	 a	 certain	 percentage	 will	 be	deducted	 from	 the	value	of	 the	 fund	 for	 the	benefit	 of	 the	 fund	operator.	Over	time	these	fees	will,	ceteris	paribus,	make	a	dent	to	investors’	returns,	given	they	are	not	 indicative	of	 some	sort	of	 a	higher	utility	or	 service	provided	 from	 the	fund	 company.	 For	 example,	 the	 Swedish	 Pensions	 Agency	 (2015,	 p.	 38)	 has	calculated	 that,	 holding	 everything	 else	 constant,	 a	management	 fee	 of	 just	 0.5	per	 cent	 will	 reduce	 one’s	 pension	 by	 15	 per	 cent	 when	 compared	 to	 a	completely	 free	 fund.1	The	alternative	 investment	 to	an	actively	managed	 fund,	which	 are	 usually	more	 expensive	 to	 invest	 in,	 are	 passively	managed	mutual	funds,	 which	 statically	 selects	 its	 investments’	 proportions	 in	 accordance	 to	 a	value-weighted	 index	 of	 assets.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 equity	 indices,	 they	 are	 usually	composed	of	the	biggest	companies	listed	on	a	certain	stock	exchange.	Were	the	more	expensive	actively	managed	funds	not	better	than	these	passive	portfolios	net	 of	 fees,	 investors	 should	 on	 average	 prefer	 to	 invest	 in	 passive	 funds,	 and	know	that	their	returns	will	be	very	close	to	the	return	of	the	tracked	index.	Swedish	 private	 investors	 have	 a	 high	 proportion	 of	 their	 savings	 in	 equity-related	 investment	vehicles.	 In	2014,	 the	 fund	companies	of	 three	of	 the	major	Swedish	banks,	Handelsbanken,	SEB	and	Swedbank,	reported	total	income	after	taxes	of	1.6	billion	SEK,	with	a	mean	EBITDA-margin	of	34	per	cent	and	a	mean	return	on	 equity	of	 78.7	per	 cent.2	Such	 return	metrics	 indicate	 that	 the	banks	
																																																								1	Average	investment	period	of	31.8	years	2	Adjusted	for	group	contributions	
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are	making	large	profits	 in	a	business	where	they	do	not	have	to	invest	a	 lot	of	capital,	 and	 where	 competition	 is	 lacking.	 It	 seems	 these	 profits	 are	 possible	because	the	average	private	 investor	places	a	high	degree	of	 trust	 in	his	or	her	bank,	 in	 that	 actively	 managed	 funds	 will	 have	 a	 good	 chance	 of	 beating	 the	index.	 We	 will	 therefore	 investigate	 whether	 expensive	 equity	 mutual	 funds	provide	a	statistically	higher	alpha	to	its	investors	or	whether	it	is	a	false	claim	and	 that	 higher	 fees	 are	 mainly	 beneficial	 to	 the	 fund	 manager.	 This	 study	investigates	 the	 divergent	 propositions	 that	 high	 management	 fees	 will	 be	beneficial	to	you	since	it	will	give	you	higher	return,	and	that	lower	fees	will	be	better	because	rational	individuals	will	seek	to	minimize	costs.	The	possible	 conclusion	 to	 this	 investigation	 is	 fundamentally	 an	 evaluation	 of	the	 rational	 options	 available	 to	 a	 Swedish	 private	 investor.	Will	 he	 or	 she	 be	better	 off	 trusting	 their	 bank	 or	 should	 they	 conclude	 that	 cheaper	 is	 always	better?	In	a	recent	survey	of	Swedish	individuals,	27	per	cent	of	the	respondents	said	 they	 are	 very	 or	 quite	 worried	 about	 their	 future	 economic	 status	 as	 a	retired	(Collectum).	The	end	result	lies	a	long	way	into	the	future,	and	the	impact	from	the	choices	one	makes	today	will	not	be	clear	for	many	years.		In	this	article,	we	build	on	some	of	the	techniques	that	have	been	developed	in	the	fund	evaluation	literature,	see	the	following	section	for	a	description	of	this	development,	 but	 applied	 these	 to	 the	 specific	 situation	 of	 whether	 high	management	 fees	could	 indicate	a	higher	 than	expected	return	 to	 its	 investors.	We	will	also	examine	whether	 there	are	differences	between	 funds	of	different	sizes.	In	the	end,	we	expect	to	find	similar	results	to	studies	conducted	in	other	markets,	namely	that	high	management	fees	will	lead	to	lower	fund	returns.		
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Firstly,	we	will	present	 the	current	 theoretical	 framework	(section	one).	 In	 the	following	section,	there	will	be	a	discussion	about	the	steps	undertaken	to	gather	relevant	 data	 for	 this	 investigation.	 The	 sources	 will	 be	 presented	 and	commented	upon.	Thereafter,	 our	 estimations,	 statistical	 and	others,	 are	given,	and	after	this	our	results	are	presented.	Lastly,	our	findings	are	concluded	with	an	analysis	and	a	comparison	with	previous	studies.	
The	theoretical	framework	
Following	the	development	of	the	efficient	market	hypothesis	in	the	mid	1900s,	Sharpe	 (1964)	 and	 Lintner	 (1965)	 individually	 developed	 methods	 of	 valuing	financial	assets	according	to	the	inherent	risk	they	bore	to	the	investor.	Sharpe	argued	that	any	investor	wishing	to	obtain	higher	return	must	also	expect	to	be	subjected	 to	 higher	 risk,	 or	 volatility,	 in	 asset	 prices.	 In	 equilibrium,	 he	 states,	there	 will	 be	 a	 “consistent	 relationship”	 between	 the	 expected	 return	 on	individual	assets	and	the	systematic	risk	of	that	asset	for	pricing	to	be	efficient.	(Sharpe,	 1964,	 p.	 436)	 The	 expected	 return	 an	 investor	 will	 receive	 will	 be	 a	direct	 function	 of	 the	 asset’s	 “covariance	 of	 its	 return	 with	 the	market	 return	divided	by	 the	variance	of	 the	market	 return”	 (Fama	and	French,	2004,	p.	 28).	The	usual	proxy	for	the	total	market	is	a	broad	U.S.	common	stock	index,	such	as	S&P	500,	 though	Richard	Roll	argued	that	such	a	proxy	 is	 too	narrow,	and	that	the	 true	 representation	 of	 the	market	may	 never	 be	 fully	 implemented	 in	 the	model.	This	is	known	as	Roll’s	critique	(Roll,	1977;	Fama	and	French,	2004).	Lintner	 also	 studied	 the	 link	 between	 risk	 and	 return,	 adding	 the	 assumption	that	 investors	 must	 have	 the	 same	 outlook	 regarding	 the	 expected	 mean	 and	variance	 concerning	 return.	 For	 some	 time,	 the	 standard	 capital	 asset	 pricing	
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model	 was	 unchallenged,	 only	 supplemented	 by	 Black	 (1972),	 who	 added	unlimited	short-selling	to	the	model	as	a	way	to	obtain	a	mean-variance	efficient	market	portfolio,	 instead	of	unlimited	borrowing	and	 lending	as	 in	 the	Sharpe-Lintner	model.	The	 CAPM	 of	 Sharpe	 and	 Lintner	 states	 that	 the	 expected	 excess	 return	 of	 an	asset	 is	completely	explained	by	 the	beta	variable,	or	 the	asset’	 systematic	risk	premium,	 and	 that	 the	 risk-return	 intercept	 of	 each	 asset	 is	 zero.	 Michael	 C.	Jensen	(1968)	added	 the	 last	piece	 to	our	model	when	he	 identified	 the	excess	return	 above	 the	 expected	 return	 given	 by	 market	 beta,	 consequently	 named	Jensen’s	alpha	(hereafter	simply	called	alpha).	If	an	investor	earns	positive	alpha	return	 on	 an	 asset	 or	 a	 portfolio	 of	 assets,	 it	 could	 point	 to	 that	 investor	possessing	 superior	 skills	 compared	 to	 the	 market.	 If,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 an	investor	earns	negative	alpha,	the	investor	is	not	doing	as	well	as	a	simple	buy-and-hold	the	market	strategy	according	to	CAPM.	Roll’s	 critique	 about	 the	 impossibility	 of	 mirroring	 the	 market	 index	 and	 the	difficulties	in	empirically	proving	the	CAPM	for	individual	assets,	led	researchers	to	apply	 it	 to	portfolios	of	assets,	where	 it	has	proven	useful.	Fama	and	French	(1993)	 further	 developed	 the	 model,	 identifying	 three	 explanatory	 factors	common	to	stock	return:	book-to-market	valuation	of	equity,	the	size	of	firms	in	terms	of	market	valuation,	and	an	overall	market	return	factor.	Carhart	(1997),	in	 a	much-cited	 paper,	 adds	 a	 fourth	 factor,	 called	momentum,	mimicking	 the	excess	return	earned	from	investing	in	winners	from	the	previous	period.	From	 the	 pricing	 question	 of	 individual	 assets	 also	 follows	 the	 problem	 of	evaluating	 portfolios	 of	 investment	 assets.	 As	 described	 above,	 risk	 and	 price	move	hand	 in	hand,	and	portfolios	of	assets	will	display	 the	same	relationship,	
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albeit	 in	 aggregate.	 Sharpe	 (1966)	 further	 extended	 his	 analysis	 by	measuring	the	 risk	of	mutual	 equity	 funds	 as	 a	 function	of	 its	 volatility.	He	 found	 that	US	funds	 from	1954	until	1963	showed	a	high	 return	correlation	with	each	other,	with	 most	 difference	 in	 performance	 depending	 on	 expense	 ratios	 and	 other	costs	rather	than	the	individual	fund	manager’s	ability	to	find	incorrectly	priced	securities.	Summing	up,	fund	performance	gross	of	fees	was	worse	than	the	Dow	Jones	index	and	good	performance	was	associated	with	low	expense	ratios.		These	findings	point	to	an	interesting	conclusion	about	the	seemingly	divergent	logic	surrounding	high	fees	introduced	earlier:	those	investors	who	trusted	their	banks	 and	 fund	 managers	 actually	 received	 less	 return	 than	 had	 they	 blindly	invested	 in	 a	 passive	 benchmark.	 Higher	 management	 fees	 did	 not	 indicate	 a	higher	future	return,	and	in	these	cases	they	only	benefited	the	manager.	These	fund	managers	did	not	manage	to	provide	a	service	worth	paying	for.	We	 looked	 into	whether	these	earlier	 findings	on	CAPM	are	valid	 in	Sweden	as	well	 as	 in	 the	 US,	 and	 regressed	 excess	 return	 on	 management	 fees.	 In	 the	current	 Swedish	 private	 economic	 debate,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 strong	 negative	attitude	towards	high	management	fees,	claiming	they	add	nothing	of	value	to	an	average	private	investor.	These	journalists	have	seized	on	financial	writings	that	have	 been	 describing	 the	 negative	 impact	 management	 fees	 have	 on	 excess	return,	 and	consequently	 the	 return	 from	 investing	 in	 funds.	Especially	 the	 so-called	savings-economist	representing	one	of	Sweden’s	largest	Internet	brokers,	Claes	Hemberg,	has	taken	a	clear	stance	against	high	fees	(Mölne,	2015).		Though	clearly	not	as	unbiased	as	he	himself	might	claim,	his	blogs	and	tweets	have	had	a	 resounding	 impact	 on	 traditional	media,	where	 journalists	 often	 connect	 the	earnings	 from	 over-priced	 funds	 to	 the,	 in	 their	 eyes,	 excessive	 profits	 that	
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Swedish	banks	have	generated	over	 the	 last	couple	of	years	(“Fondjätte	sänker	sina	avgifter”;	Andersson,	2016).	Though	every	actor	has	his	or	her	own	reason	for	arguing	for	low-cost	index	funds,	Swedish	private	investors	have	taken	notice	of	their	advice	since	the	share	of	invested	capital	in	index	funds	has	risen	lately.	From	2010	to	2015,	the	total	amount	of	net	savings	in	equity	index	funds	was	85	billion	SEK,	while	 traditional,	 actively	managed	equity	 funds	experienced	a	net	outflow	of	11	billion	SEK.	The	share	of	assets	allocated	to	index	funds	increased	from	six	to	eleven	per	cent	during	the	same	time	period	(Fondbolagens	förening,	p.	 6,	 2016).	 Because	 of	 the	 increased	 share	 of	 index	 funds,	mean	management	fees	have	been	decreasing	 year	by	 year	 (Eriksson,	 2014).	To	 evaluate	whether	the	 claims	 that	 lower	 fees	 are	 better	 can	 be	 substantiated,	 and	 whether	 the	previously	 stated	 trend	 towards	 low-cost	 index	 funds	 is	 rational	 from	 the	perspective	of	return,	we	have	investigated	the	equity	fund	returns	in	Sweden	in	the	following	sections.	Whether	 or	 not	 management	 fees	 are	 relevant	 to	 a	 private	 investor	 will	 be	presented	below.	In	articles	from	Fama	&	French	(2010)	and	Carhart	(1997)	they	have	been	describing	equity	 fund	returns	relevant	to	the	US	fund	market.	They	build	 on	 earlier	 valuation	 models	 from	 Sharpe	 and	 Lintner,	 adding	 their	 own	models	 of	 factor	 loadings.	 The	 original	 CAPM	 is	 still	 widely	 used	 in	 financial	education	 and	 application,	 partly	 because	 of	 its	 simplicity,	 and	will	 be	 used	 in	this	paper.	Our	main	article	 is	Fama	and	French’s	Luck	versus	Skill	in	the	Cross-
Section	of	Mutual	Fund	Returns.	
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Previous	Swedish	studies	Swedish	fund	returns	have	not	been	as	extensively	researched	as	the	returns	of	funds	 investing	 in	 the	 US	 market,	 but	 studies	 by	 Dahlquist,	 Engström	 and	Söderlind	 (2000),	 Engström	 (2004),	 and	 Flam	 and	 Vestman	 (2014)	 have	estimated	 the	 excess	 return	 for	 different	 samples	 and	 time	 periods,	 with	dissimilar	results.	Dahlquist	et	al.	(2000)	studied	the	time	period	from	1993	until	1997	 and	 found	mixed	 results	 depending	 on	 the	 tax	 treatment	 of	 portfolios	 of	funds.	There	was	a	positive	but	statistically	insignificant	alpha	of	on	average	0.24	for	ordinary	Swedish	equity	funds	and	a	statistically	significant	negative	alpha	of	on	 average	 1.30	 for	 equity	 funds	 with	 preferential	 tax	 treatment	(allemansfonder).	 The	 relationship	 between	 administrative	 fees	 and	 fund	performance	 was	 found	 to	 be	 negative,	 both	 for	 ordinary	 equity	 funds	 and	money	market	funds.	Also	relevant	to	our	study,	they	found	that	the	size	of	funds	with	 preferential	 tax	 treatment	 has	 a	 strong	 and	 negative	 relation	 to	 fund	performance.	Engström	(2004)	uses	a	sample	of	Swedish	equity	 funds	from	1996	until	2000.	He	finds	an	average	alpha	of	1.7%	per	year,	with	an	average	fund	beta	of	0.9.	The	negative	 relation	between	 fund	 size	and	performance	 found	by	Dahlquist	et	al.	(2000)	is	suggested	to	stem	from	the	fact	that	smaller	funds	to	a	higher	degree	have	been	able	to	invest	in	small	cap	firms,	which	have	been	performing	better	than	large	and	mid	cap	stocks	during	the	time	period	of	investigation.	Finally,	 Flam	 and	 Vestman	 (2014)	 find	 positive	 net	 alphas	 for	 Swedish	 equity	funds	at	around	2.5	from	1993	until	2002	and	negative	net	alphas	of	-1.47	during	the	period	of	 2002	 to	2013,	 commenting	 that	 inferences	 should	be	made	 from	the	 latter	period,	 as	 there	 is	 “much	 greater	 competition	 among	 funds	 after	 the	
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break.”	 They	 conclude	 that	 there	was	 no	 evidence	 of	 persistent	 fund	manager	skills	and	advocate	that	investors	should	invest	in	index	funds.	
The	Swedish	equity	fund	market	Most	 Swedes	 have	 invested	 in	 equity	 funds,	 either	 privately	 through	 fund	accounts	with	their	bank	or	broker,	or	by	the	mandatory	pension	system,	where	the	employer	places	2.5	per	 cent	of	 the	gross	wage	with	 the	Swedish	Pensions	Agency	as	pension	credits.	Every	individual	can	then	select	up	to	five	funds.	The	premium	pension	scheme	 includes	more	 than	800	 funds	of	different	 types	and	investment	 objectives,	 which	 comply	 with	 certain	 standards.	 Non-selectors’	credits	 will	 be	 automatically	 placed	 with	 the	 Swedish	 state	 AP7	 fund,	 which	initially	invests	all	of	the	funds	in	equity,	gradually	increasing	the	share	of	fixed-income	assets	once	the	individual	turns	55.	Owning	 equity	 funds	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 common	 types	 of	 investments	 for	Swedes.	At	the	end	of	2014,	1	140	billion	SEK	were	 invested	in	Swedish	equity	funds.	Funds	within	the	umbrella	of	the	Swedish	state’s	premium	pension	agency	amount	to	529	billion	SEK.		Mutual	 funds	 charge	 its	 investors	 fees	 for	 the	 service	 it	 is	 providing.	 Can	investors	know	that	a	high	fee	will	translate	into	high	returns?	
Data	
We	have	used	several	sources	in	collecting	our	data.	First	of	all	we	specified	the	universe	of	our	 investigation.	Since	we	aim	to	describe	an	 investment	situation	relevant	to	a	Swedish	private	investor,	we	focused	on	mutual	funds	that	invest	in	the	Swedish	market	with	a	focus	on	equity	assets.	The	latter	criterion	means	that	
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a	 fund	needs	 to	 hold	 at	 least	 90	 per	 cent	 of	 its	 assets	 in	 equity.	 As	mentioned	above,	CAPM	is	often	used	to	evaluate	portfolios	of	assets	and	relevant	here.		The	fund	return	is	stated	net	of	all	fees	and	costs,	though	not	of	private	taxes.	In	order	to	obtain	comparable	return	data,	we	also	only	included	funds	that	are	domiciled	 in	 Sweden,	which	 among	 other	 things	mean	 they	 operate	 under	 the	same	 tax	 conditions.	 To	 include	 funds	 domiciled	 in	 other	 countries	 could	potentially	disrupt	our	findings.	The	 source	 for	 all	 fund	 data	 has	 been	 the	 Bloomberg	 database,	 which	 is	 a	comprehensive	collection	of	financial	data.	It	lists	773	funds	with	a	geographical	investment	focus	on	Sweden.	From	 our	 specifications	 of	 funds	 domiciled	 in	 Sweden,	 which	 invest	 in	 the	Swedish	 stock	 market,	 and	 mainly	 in	 equities,	 there	 were	 123	 funds	 in	 the	sample.	Only	funds	that	existed	from	the	beginning	of	the	year	2000	until	the	end	of	 our	 period	 in	 2014	were	 then	 sampled,	which	 left	 us	with	 38	 funds.	 These	funds	have	return	data	during	the	whole	time	period	from	2000	until	the	end	of	our	 investigation	 in	 2014	 as	 the	 Bloomberg	 database	 includes	 all	 funds	 in	operation	as	of	today	(2015).	The	complete	list	of	sampled	funds	is	presented	in	Appendix	1.	Because	of	small	glitches	in	the	recording	and	sampling	of	the	said	return	data,	and	 to	 get	 fund	 data	 readily	 comparable	 to	 the	 returns	 of	 many	 funds,	 we	downloaded	the	total	weekly	net	returns	from	the	database.		In	 addition,	 the	 choice	 of	 benchmark	 for	 evaluate	 the	 performance	 of	 funds	 is	also	 important.	 In	 financial	 literature,	 evaluating	 one’s	 performance	 in	comparison	with	a	benchmark	is	called	the	risk-adjusted	return.	
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The	proxy	for	the	market	return	is	the	SIX	PRX,	which	is	a	value-weighted	total	return	 index	 of	 the	 Stockholm	 Stock	 Exchange	 with	 portfolio	 restrictions	 that	comply	 with	 UCITS	 (Undertakings	 for	 Collective	 Investments	 in	 Transferable	Securities).	These	restrictions	state	that	a	single	stock	is	capped	at	a	maximum	of	ten	per	cent	of	the	fund’s	total	assets	and	that	 funds	cannot	hold	more	than	40	per	cent	of	its	assets	in	stocks	where	they	have	invested	more	than	5	per	cent	of	the	fund’s	total	assets.	This	means	that	any	fund	must	hold	at	least	16	stocks.	The	index	 is	 therefore	 suitable	 for	 fund	 performance	 comparisons,	 as	 similar	 fund	restrictions	exist	in	other	market,	e.g.	in	the	U.S..	All	dividends	are	reinvested	in	the	index.	As	with	the	data	for	fund	return,	the	weekly	total	return	of	the	SIX	PRX	was	downloaded	from	the	Bloomberg	database.	The	 risk-free	 rate	 is	 Swedish	 T-bills	 (statsskuldsväxlar)	with	 a	maturity	 of	 one	month.	 These	 data	were	 obtained	 from	 the	 Swedish	 Central	 Bank.	 In	 previous	Swedish	studies	by	Engström	(2004)	and	Dahlquist	et	al.	(2000),	they	have	used	the	seven	day	Stockholm	interbank	lending	rate	STIBOR	as	the	risk-free	rate	of	return.	Flam	and	Vestman	(2014)	on	the	other	hand	used	the	STIBOR	1-month	rate.	 We	 compared	 our	 data	 to	 T-bills,	 because	 an	 alternative	 investment	 to	equity	for	a	Swedish	private	investor	would	be	a	money	market	mutual	fund	that	invests	in	Swedish	T-bills	at	low	risk.	The	return	data	of	 the	equity	 funds,	 the	market	proxy	and	 the	risk-free	rate	of	return	were	stated	on	a	weekly	basis,	for	reasons	of	attaining	more	observations,	and	therefore	a	better	statistical	basis.	Weekly	data	was	also	used	by	Engström	(2004)	 and	 Dahlquist	 et	 al.	 (2000).	 Flam	 and	 Vestman	 (2014)	 used	 monthly	return	data	instead.	
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The	management	fees	of	the	funds	in	our	sample	have	also	been	obtained	from	the	Bloomberg	database.	These	are	the	current	management	fees	at	the	time	of	sampling.	The	management	 fees	have	been	assumed	 to	be	 constant	during	our	sample	 period	 because	 of	 lacking	 historical	 data.	 To	 make	 sure	 that	 the	management	 fees	had	 stayed	approximately	 the	 same	over	 time,	we	 looked	up	the	 historical	 fees	 of	 five	 randomly	 selected	 funds	 every	 year	 during	 our	 time	period.	These	management	fees	were	then	compared	to	the	most	recent	data	and	we	 found	 that	 the	 fees	 were	 indeed	 unchanged.	 Hence	 we	 assumed	 that	 the	management	 fees	of	all	 funds	were	stable	during	these	years.	We	 looked	at	 the	funds	annual	reports	from	previous	years	to	make	this	test.		
Potential	biases	We	 have	 not	 been	 able	 to	 include	 funds	 that	 existed	 in	 2000	 but	 have	 since	disappeared	from	the	market,	either	because	of	a	merger	with	other	funds	or	the	funds	 now	 being	 closed.	 If	 there	 indeed	 has	 been	 an	 omission	 of	 funds,	 these	omitted	funds	would	likely	have	been	poor	performing,	which	if	anything	would	give	 our	 estimates	 an	 upward	 bias	 (Dahlquist,	 Engström	 and	 Söderlind,	 2010,	Gruber,	1996).	Dahlquist	et	al.	estimate	that	surviving	Swedish	funds	perform	0.7	per	cent	better	per	year	than	the	average	of	all	funds.	U.S.	studies	have	estimated	survivorship	bias	from	0.2	per	cent	(Carhart,	1997)	to	1	per	cent	per	year	(Elton,	Gruber,	Blake,	1996).		As	 mentioned	 above,	 we	 assumed	 that	 management	 fees	 have	 been	 constant	during	 the	 sample	 period	 after	 sampling	 a	 few	 historical	 data.	 This	 may,	however,	not	be	true	for	every	fund	in	our	sample.	
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The	number	of	observations	for	some	funds,	is	quite	small	which	could	question	the	 credibility	 of	 the	 OLS	 regression	 analysis.	 As	 we	 have	 conducted	 an	investigation	 of	 the	 funds	 as	 a	 whole,	 we	 however,	 believe	 there	 are	 enough	observations.	
Model	
We	use	the	following	standard	capital	asset	pricing	model	to	estimate	individual	alphas:		 𝑅!" − 𝑅!" =  𝛼! + 𝑏! 𝑅!" − 𝑅!" + 𝑒!"																																(1)	Where	Rit	 is	the	return	of	fund	i	during	time	period	t,	Rft	 is	the	rate	of	return	of	the	 risk-free	 asset	 f	 during	 time	 period	 t,	 and	RMt	 is	 the	 return	 of	 the	market	during	the	same	time	period.	eit	is	an	error	term	specific	to	each	fund.	𝛼! 	is	Jensen’s	alpha	measure	of	excess	return	for	fund	i.	The	beta	coefficient	is	a	measure	 of	 the	 fund’s	 systematic	 risk.	 Alpha	 and	 beta	 are	 the	 explanatory	variables	 in	our	regression.	The	error	 term	 is	a	 fund	specific	risk	 that	captures	the	 effects	 neither	 explained	 by	 the	 skill	 of	 fund	 managers	 nor	 the	 beta	sensitivity	to	covariance	in	the	market.	
Method	
We	 investigated	 the	 rates	 of	 return	 for	 all	 38	 funds	 in	 our	 sample	 during	 the	period	from	2000	to	2014.	This	time	period	was	selected	because	we	wanted	to	investigate	 a	 relatively	 long	 period.	 In	 fund	 advertisement	 material,	 fund	operators	 must	 present	 return	 over	 at	 least	 five	 years	 for	 equity	 funds	(Fondbolagens	 förening,	 2008,	 p.	 3).	 	 Previous	 Swedish	 studies	 have	
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concentrated	in	fewer	years	than	we	have	except	for	Flam	and	Vestman	(2014)	who	have	 looked	 at	 twenty	 full	 years	 of	 data.	We	believe	 a	 longer	 time	period	will	provide	better	results.	Our	first	step	was	to	take	our	downloaded	weekly	fund	return	data	and	subtract	the	risk-free	rate	of	return	for	every	week	to	get	the	risk-adjusted	weekly	return	for	each	and	every	fund.	This	gave	us	the	left	hand	side	of	CAPM	in	equation	(1),	Jensen’s	alpha.	We	then	subtracted	the	risk-free	rate	of	return	from	the	weekly	return	 of	 the	market	 proxy	 SIX	 PRX,	 to	 acquire	 the	 excess	 return	 of	 the	 stock	market.	Now	that	we	had	these	data,	we	could	estimate	alpha	and	beta	for	each	fund	 in	 Stata	 according	 to	 CAPM,	 see	 equation	 (1).	 Using	 the	 ordinary	 least	squares	(OLS)	procedure,	we	ran	the	regression	of	the	fund	excess	returns	on	the	risk-adjusted	market	return	as	 the	 independent	variable,	 to	estimate	alpha	and	beta	 values.	 These	 alpha	 and	 beta	 values	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Appendix	 1	 fund	 by	fund.	In	the	next	step	we	regressed	all	of	these	alphas	on	the	management	fees	of	the	corresponding	funds	using	the	OLS	procedure,	as	shown	in	equation	(2),	𝛼!=𝑎 + 𝑏(𝐹𝐸𝐸)																																																																(2)	where	FEE	are	the	management	fees	of	that	fund.	The	line	of	best	fit,	the	regression	line,	presents	the	best	linear	correlation,	if	any,	between	the	two	variables.	Accordingly,	beta	values	capture	the	coefficient	of	the	variable	 on	 the	 dependent	 variable,	 or	 the	 return	 over	 the	 risk-free	 rate,	 and	should	 be	 close	 to	 one	 in	 CAPM.	 Fund	 return	 not	 explained	 by	 the	 model	 is	captured	 by	 the	 intercept,	 alpha,	 and	 it	 could	 be	 thought	 of	 the	 return	attributable	 to	 fund	 investors	 through	 the	 individual	 or	 collective	 abilities	 of	fund	 managers.	 As	 such,	 alphas	 would	 have	 to	 be	 above	 zero	 net	 of	 fees	 and	
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statistically	significant	to	be	taken	as	a	sign	of	the	funds	providing	their	investors	with	services	worth	paying	for.	As	a	further	investigation	we	also	looked	into	the	fund	performance	during	time	periods	where	the	stock	market	returns	have	been	clearly	positive,	i.e.	during	the	upward	trends	of	2003	until	2007	and	2009	until	2014.	We	chose	these	periods	to	see	whether	there	would	be	different	results	during	periods	of	a	strong	stock	market	 trend,	compared	with	a	 full	business	cycle,	and	what	a	private	 investor	could	infer	from	this.	Flam	and	Vestman	(2014)	also	divided	their	study	into	two	time	periods,	one	from	1993	to	2001	and	one	from	2002	to	2013.	These	two	time	periods	 did	 not	 experience	 as	 clear	 upward	 or	 downward	 trends	 as	 our	 time	periods	did.	Their	article	is	interesting	in	that	they	find	different	results	in	their	division.	During	the	latter	time	frame,	the	fund	sample	has	also	been	divided	according	to	the	total	net	asset	values	(NAV)	of	each	fund	at	the	start	date	of	each	sub-period.	The	funds	were	divided	into	three	groups	depending	on	the	size	of	the	NAV.	The	lowest	 three	 deciles	 were	 assigned	 to	 a	 group	 of	 small	 funds	 and	 the	 highest	three	 deciles	were	 assigned	 to	 a	 group	 of	 large	 funds,	 and	 both	 of	 the	 groups	consist	of	11	 funds.	 	The	alphas	of	 the	 funds	making	up	 these	 subgroups	were	regressed	 on	management	 fees.	 The	middle	 group	 of	 remaining	 funds	was	 not	compared	 to	 the	whole	 sample,	 as	we	were	more	 interested	 in	 the	 largest	 and	smallest	funds	for	statistical	analysis.			
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Results	
In	the	sample	of	38	funds	present	during	the	period	from	2000	until	2014,	there	are	29	716	individual	observations	of	weekly	fund	return.		In	aggregate,	fund	returns	are	highly	correlated	to	the	market	return,	which	is	no	surprise	 since	 funds	 should	 hold	 a	 large	 portion	 of	 the	 market	 in	 aggregate.	Estimated	beta	range	from	0.90	to	0.98,	see	Table	1.	This	points	to	a	fallacy	in	the	argument	fund	managers	often	make,	namely	that	actively	managed	funds	will	go	their	own	way,	and	that	a	private	investor	is	paying	for	a	skilled	professional	to	compose	 an	 individually	 selected	 portfolio	 of	 the	 best	 available	 investment	opportunities	in	the	market.	These	investors	have,	in	aggregate,	not	received	the	service	they	have	been	paying	for.	 Table	1.	Estimated	performance	measures	Time	period	 Fund	category	(NAV)	 Observations	 𝛼	(T-value)	 𝛽	(T-value)	 𝑅!	 Management	fee	coefficient	(T-value)	2000-2014	 All	 38	 -0.01	(-1.55)	 0.90	(-8.58)	 0.013	 0.013		(0.69)	2003-2007	 All	 38	 -0.01	(-1,00)	 0.94	(-3.81)	 0.051	 0.04		(1.40)	Small	 11	 0.02	(0.74)	 0.92	(-2.36)	 0.051	 0.08		(1.18)	Large	 11	 -0.03	(-4.28)	 0.97	(-1.93)	 0.07	 -0.02	(-0.83)	2009-2014	 All	 38	 -0.002	(-0.23)	 0.95	(-3.50)	 0.073	 0.04		(1.68)	Small	 11	 0.013	(0.94)	 0.95	(-1.65)	 0.245	 0.06		(1.71)	Large	 11	 -0.01	(-1.12)	 0.98	(-0.74)	 0.002	 -0.01		(-0.14)		Net	 alpha,	 Jensen’s	 alpha,	 are	 all	 quite	 close	 to	 zero,	which	 also	 point	 to	 there	being	 no	 overall	 advantage	 from	 investing	 in	 funds	 to	 achieve	 excess	 return	above	that	predicted	by	CAPM.	Interestingly,	the	alpha	values	for	the	categories	
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of	 small	 funds	were	 both	 positive,	while	 the	 alpha	 values	 for	 the	 categories	 of	large	funds	and	for	the	whole	sample	were	negative.		
Figure	1.	Alpha	and	Management	fee,	all	funds	2000-2014	
	Each	dot	represents	a	fund’s	alpha	and	management	fee	in	per	cent	from	2000	to	2014.		The	fitted	line	shows	the	OLS	regression	line	of	best	fit.		Alpha	 does	 increase	with	management	 fee,	 but	 alpha	 is	 still	 negative	 even	 for	funds	with	higher	fees,	see	Figure	1.	All	of	the	𝑅!	values	are	very	low,	which	point	to	a	low	explanatory	power	of	the	model	in	these	estimations.	The	management	fee	coefficients	are	also	very	low.	For	most	categories,	they	are	positive	but	well	under	0.1.	The	T-values,	however,	do	not	show	any	statistical	significance	except	for	many	of	the	beta	values.	The	alphas	are	too	small	to	point	to	an	aggregate	economical	significance.		
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Overall,	 the	model	 points	 to	 there	 being	 no	 significant	 gains	 from	 investing	 in	funds	with	 high	management	 fees.	 The	 generally	 high	T-values	 for	 beta	 values	mean	that	in	those	samples	the	market	proxy	return	explain	above	90	per	cent	of	the	return	of	those	funds.	
Conclusions	
In	 this	 paper	we	 looked	 at	whether	 an	 investor	 could	 expect	 higher	 return	 by	investing	in	funds	with	relatively	high	management	fees,	as	this	could	be	seen	as	a	cost	of	a	superior	service	provided	by	the	management	team.	We	looked	at	the	Swedish	fund	market,	where	we	sampled	funds	investing	in	the	Swedish	equity	market	 from	2000	until	2014.	As	a	 further	 investigation,	we	also	 looked	at	 the	results	from	2003	until	2007	and	from	2009	until	2014,	where	we	also	divided	the	sample	into	three	groups	depending	on	the	size	of	the	funds.		Alpha	values	predicted	by	CAPM	were	found	to	be	negative	for	most	time	periods	and	size-groupings	during	the	sub-periods.	However,	alphas	for	the	groupings	of	smaller	 funds	 were	 positive,	 which	 was	 surprizing	 considering	 that	 funds	operate	in	economies	of	scale,	where	extra	assets	can	be	invested	practically	at	no	extra	costs,	barring	trading	commissions.	During	these	two	periods	of	upward	market	 trends,	 it	 could	 have	 been	 more	 profitable	 to	 invest	 in	 smaller	 funds.	These	results	are,	however,	not	statistically	significant.	We	think	that	the	better	performance	of	these	smaller	funds	could	come	from	larger	funds	being	content	and	from	the	fact	that	the	sheer	size	of	some	funds	makes	it	near	impossible	for	them	to	compose	a	portfolio	that	will	not	mimic	the	weight	of	a	market	index	in	such	a	small	market	as	the	Swedish	equity	market.	Engström	(2004)	found	that	part	of	this	performance	of	smaller	funds	could	be	explained	by	them	being	able	
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to	invest	in	small	cap	stocks,	which	have	been	performing	better.	We	find	similar	results	as	earlier	Swedish	studies.	Flam	and	Vestman	(2014),	which	may	be	the	one	most	similar	to	ours,	find	negative	net	alphas	of	1.47	from	2002	until	2013.	Dahlquist	 et	 al.	 (2000)	 found	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 fees	 and	 fund	performance	for	funds	with	preferential	tax	treatment	was	negative,	and	that	the	size	 of	 funds	 correlates	 negatively	with	 performance.	 Lastly,	 Engström	 (2004)	found	 a	 conflicting	 average	 alpha	 of	 1.7%	 per	 year,	 but	 as	 Flam	 and	 Vestman	(2014)	 comment,	 this	may	depend	on	 the	 specific	 circumstances	of	his	 sample	period	1996-2000.		Fama	and	French	(2010)	and	Carhart	(1997)	have	found	that	fund	managers	on	average	are	unable	to	achieve	a	higher	net	return	attributable	to	fund	investors	than	 the	 market	 index.	 Carhart	 finds	 that	 fees	 are	 negatively	 and	 statistically	related	 to	 fund	 performance.	 We	 expected	 similar	 results	 for	 the	 Swedish	market,	in	that	higher	fund	fees	do	not	translate	into	a	higher	risk-adjusted	fund	return.	While	we	have	not	 found	 statistically	 significant	 results	 supporting	our	expectations,	 we	 have	 certainly	 not	 found	 tendencies	 pointing	 in	 the	 opposite	direction.	The	T	values	for	betas	point	to	the	return	of	the	general	market	being	a	statistically	significant	determiner	for	individual	fund	return.	As	such	we	would	advocate	 investing	 in	 low	 fee	 funds,	 since	 higher	 fees	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 point	 to	superior	returns,	but	fund	returns	depend	on	the	general	market	conditions.		We	have	not	been	able	 to	control	 for	survivorship	bias	 in	our	sample.	As	such,	fund	returns	may	be	overstated	and	the	results	could	be	different	if	funds	indeed	have	been	removed,	merged	or	discontinued	during	our	time	period.	As	for	the	generally	low	R2	values	present	in	all	time	periods	and	sub-groupings	of	funds,	they	point	to	the	low	explanatory	power	of	the	model.	There	are	factors	
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other	than	management	fee	that	do	a	better	job	of	explaining	excess	return.	We	conclude	that	management	fees	are	uncorrelated	with	fund	excess	return.	Beta	values	average	0.90	for	the	period	from	2000	until	2014,	which	is	relatively	low	when	compared	with	the	results	from	a	pure	alpha-beta	factor	CAPM	of	an	equally	 weighted	 portfolio	 of	 mutual	 funds	 used	 by	 Fama	 and	 French	 (2010),	where	 betas,	 as	 estimated	 by	 the	 model,	 are	 1.01	 with	 a	 t-statistic	 of	 1.12.	However,	Engström	(2004)	found	an	average	beta	that	is	identical	to	our	beta.	The	 question	 now	 is	 how	 to	 apply	 these	 findings	 to	 a	 real	 market	 situation.	Several	 well-cited	 American	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 management	 fees	 will	result	 in	 lower	 return	 for	 investors.	 The	 manager	 cannot	 compensate	 well	enough	for	this	hurdle	to	generate	excess	return	to	his	or	her	investors.	We	have	shown	that	this	seems	to	apply	to	the	Swedish	market	as	well.	High	management	fees	 are	 a	 poor	 predictor	 for	 future	 returns,	 and	 an	 average	 investor	 should	therefore	try	to	avoid	them.	Why	 do	 private	 investors	 not	 immediately	 withdraw	 all	 of	 their	 savings	 from	expensive	funds	and	put	them	into	cheaper	index	funds	instead?	There	is	some	kind	 of	 inertia	 here	 that	makes	 investors	 uninterested	 or	 unwilling	 to	 change.	One	could	also	imagine	that	an	average	individual	trusts	his	or	her	bank	to	give	objective	 advice	 that	will	 primarily	benefit	 the	 individual,	 not	 the	bank.	 Saving	for	retirement	is	a	 long-term	project	and	the	changes	one	makes	today	will	not	have	a	 large	 impact	 for	many,	many	years,	which	 is	why	the	 importance	of	 fair	and	sound	advice	early	on	is	so	much	more	crucial.	It	is	interesting	to	notice	that	part	of	the	reason	why	the	Internet	brokers	try	to	stress	 the	 importance	 of	 low	 fees	 is	 that	 it	 sets	 them	 apart	 from	 the	 old	institution,	 i.e.	 traditional	 branch-banks	 and	 fund	 managers.	 This	 is	 one	 point	
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where	 they	 can	be	 seen	 as	 the	 “good	 guys”	 that	 have	 the	 investor’s	 interest	 at	heart.	For	future	research,	it	would	be	interesting	to	look	at	funds	during	a	downward-trending	market,	to	see	whether	some	funds	perform	better	than	others.	It	could	also	be	interesting	to	include	other	factors	in	the	model,	than	those	in	a	standard	CAPM.	 As	we	 investigated	 an	 equal-weighted	 sample	 of	 funds,	 future	 research	could	also	look	at	the	question	with	value-weighted	samples.	Also	from	a	behavioural	point	of	view,	it	would	be	interesting	to	look	at	how	an	individual	 about	 to	 invest	would	 apply	 findings	 such	 as	 those	 presented	 here,	when	selecting	funds.													
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Appendix	
Appendix	1	–	Selection	of	funds		Ticker	 Full	name	 Alpha	(T-value)	 Beta	(T-value)	 R2	 n	 Management	fee	AKSVERA	SS	 AKTIE	ANSVAR	SVERIGE-A-ACC	 0.007	(0.13)	 0.888	(44.41)	 0.717	 780	 1.4	AKTIESV	SS	 AMF	AKTIEFOND	SVERIGE	 	0.048	(0.89)	 0.890	(45.7)	 0.728	 781	 0.4	AKTOPSV	SS	 AKTIESPARARNA	TOPP	SVERIGE	 -0.047	(-0.82)	 0.986	(47.64)		 0.744	 782	 0.3	CARCANC	SS	 SKANDIA	CANCERFONDEN	 -0.029	(-0.53)	 0.913	(44.95)	 0.721	 782	 1.41	CARVARL	SS	 SKANDIA	VARLDSNATURFONDEN	 -0.030	(-0.53)	 0.904		(44.15)	 0.714	 782	 1.41	CATREAV	SS	 CATELLA-REAVINSTFOND	 -0.006	(-0.10)	 0.966		(43.28)	 0.706	 782	 1.5	CATSVPA	SS	 CATELLA	SVERIGE	INDEX	 -0.012		(-0.25)	 0.938		(55.23)	 0.796	 782	 0.75	DGAKTIE	SS	 DIDNER	&	GERGE	AKTIEFOND	 0.074	(1.33)	 0.978		(48.77)	 0.753	 782	 1.22	DSVERIG	SS	 DANSKE	INVEST	SVERIGE	 -0.008	(-0.13)	 0.951	(44.45)	 0.717	 781	 1.325	ENTSVER	SS	 ENTER	SVERIGE	 -0.021	(-0.41)	 0.963	(50.38)		 0.764	 782	 1.7	ENTSVFK	SS	 ENTER	SVERIGE	PRO	 0.010	(0.18)	 0.965	(48.14)		 0.748	 782	 0.5	FOLAKSA	SS	 FOLKSAMS	AKTIEFOND	SVERIGE	 -0.082	(-1.45)	 0.968	(47.28)	 0.743	 776	 0.7	HANDAKI	SS	 HANDELSBANKEN	SVERIGE	INDEX	 -0.022	(-0.39)	 0.908		(43.88)	 	0.711	 782	 0.65	HBOFOND		 HANDELSBANKEN	BOFOND	 -0.082	(-1.38)	 0.936		(43.60)	 0.709	 782	 1.5	HQSVERA	SS	 CARNEGIE	SVERIGEFOND	 0.035	(0.62)	 0.848		(41.46)	 0.687	 782	 1.4	HREAVIN	SS	 HANDELSBANKEN	SVERIGEFOND	 -0.043	(-0.69)	 0.951		(41.89)	 0.692	 782	 1	HSMABOL		 HANDELSBANKEN	SVENSKA	SMABOL	 0.037	(0.55)	 0.807		(33.10)	 0.584	 782	 1.5	LANSMAB	SS	 LANSFORSAKRINGAR	SMABOLAGSFO	 0.030	(0.38)	 0.705	(24.38)	 	0.432	 782	 1.6	LANSVER	SS	 LANSFORSAKRINGAR	SVERIGE	AKT	 -0.030		(-0.50)	 0.893	(39.73)	 0.669	 782	 1.3	MERNOAL		 NORDEA	ALLEMANSFOND	ALFA	 -0.060	(-1.11)	 0.856		(44.09)	 0.713	 782	 1.41	MERNOOL		 NORDEA	ALLEMANS-FOND	OLYMPIA	 -0.055	(-1.03)	 0.857		(44.34)	 	0.716	 782	 1.5	
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MERNOSV		 NORDEA	SVERIGEFOND	 -0.058	(-0.96)	 0.944	(42.99)	 0.711	 754	 1.41	OHMSVER		 OHMAN	SVERIGEFOND	 -0.079	(-1.36)	 0.961	(45.82)	 0.730	 780	 1.2	ROBAIVA	SS	 ALLEMANSFOND	KOMPLETT	 -0.058	(-1.12)	 0.810		(43.55)	 	0.708	 782	 1.42	ROBEXPA	SS	 SWEDBANK	ROBURS	EXPORTFOND	 0.031	(0.53)	 0.973		(46.45)	 	0.734	 782	 1.42	ROBSVMA		 SWEDBANK	ROBUR	SVER	FD	MEGA	 -0.002	(-0.05)	 0.948	(49.59)	 	0.759	 782	 0.52	SEBSSCR	SS	 SEB	SVERIGE	SMABOLAG	CHANS/R	 0.0589	(0.84)	 0.789		(31.12)	 0.553	 782	 1.5	SEBSVA1	SS	 SEB	SVERIGEFOND	 -0.0467	(-0.82)	 0.938		(45.20)	 0.723	 782	 1.3	SEBSVA2	SS	 SEB	SVERIGEFOND	STORA	BOLAG	 -0.050	(-0.87)	 0.912	(43.26)	 	0.705	 782	 1.3	SEBSVCR	SS	 SEB	SVERIGE	CHANS/RISK	 -0.031	(-0.46)	 0.955		(39.10)	 0.662	 782	 1.3	SEBSVSM	SS	 SEB	SVERIGE	SMABOLAGSFOND	 0.034	(0.53)	 0.778		(33.22)	 0.585	 782	 1.5	SEBSVST	SS	 SEB	SVERIGE	STIFTELSEFOND	 -0.016	(-0.27)	 0.978	(45.83)	 0.729	 782	 1.5	SKAASMS	SS	 SKANDIA	SMABOLAG	SVERIGE	 0.085	(1.29)	 0.800	(33.37)	 	0.588	 782	 1.4	SKAASVE	SS	 SKANDIA	SVERIGE	 -0.011	(-0.20)	 0.911	(46.24)	 0.732	 782	 1.4	SPPAKSV	SS	 SPP	AKTIEFOND	SVERIGE	 -0.022	(-0.37)	 0.939	(43.97)	 0.723	 742	 0.7	SPPAKTS	SS	 SPP	AKTIEINDEX	SVERIGE	 -0.034	(-0.53)	 0.936		(41.02)	 0.683	 782	 0.2		SWSMSVE		 SWEDBANK	ROB	SMABOL	SVERIGE	 0.077	(1.11)	 0.800	(31.74)	 0.563	 782	 1.42	TRETIII	SS	 NORDEA	SWEDISH	STARS	 -0.020		(-0.35)	 	0.926	(45.70)	 0.728	 782	 1.5				
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Appendix	2	–	search	criteria	from	the	Bloomberg	database	
	
		
Selected	screening	criteria Matches
Universe	criteria 573240
Fund	geographical	focus:	Sweden 773
Fund	type:	Mutual	fund 263
Country	of	domicile:	Sweden 220
Asset	class	focus:	Equity 133
Fund	primary	share	class	=	Y 123
Analytic	criteria
Total	return	10Y 123
Total	return	5Y 123
Total	return	3Y 123
Total	return	1Y 123
History	length 123
Fund	manager	stated	fee 123
Fund	total	assets	(mil) 123
Bloomberg	data
